From the big screen to the streets of Kaunas by Swain, Amanda Jeanne
 
Cahiers du monde russe
Russie - Empire russe - Union soviétique et États
indépendants 
54/3-4 | 2013
L’expérience soviétique à son apogée - Culture et
société des années Brežnev / Volume II
From the big screen to the streets of Kaunas
Youth cultural practices and Communist Party discourse in Soviet
Lithuania
Du grand écran aux rues de Kaunas : les pratiques culturelles des jeunes et le









Date of publication: 1 July 2013





Amanda Jeanne Swain, « From the big screen to the streets of Kaunas », Cahiers du monde russe
[Online], 54/3-4 | 2013, Online since 01 July 2016, Connection on 19 April 2019. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/monderusse/7960  ; DOI : 10.4000/monderusse.7960 
2011
AmAndA JeAnne SwAin
From the Big Screen  
to the StreetS oF KAunAS
Youth cultural practices and communist Party discourse 
in Soviet Lithuania*
In mid‑March 1972, the ilm Mažoji Išpažintis [Small confession], based on the 
1969  novel Arberonas by Vytautas Bubnys, was released in Soviet Lithuania. 
The ilm portrayed one week in the life of a secondary school student, Arūnas 
gulbinas.1 “i am always waiting for Sunday,” Arūnas said in the irst line of the 
book. Sunday – a day off from school and work, when he can sleep in and take it 
easy—represented Arūnas’ general attitude toward life. he started the day singing 
a pop‑style song in English – “I love you; I love you; oh, oh, oh” – and dancing 
the twist. Indeed, the teenager spent much of his time during the week listening 
to music on a transistor radio and hanging out with his friends, not caring about 
the poor grades he received at school. in one scene, his best friend Benas played 
guitar and sang pop songs while sitting “American‑style” (amerikoniškai) with his 
feet on the table. Arūnas was disrespectful towards his elders, talking back to both 
his father and the school director. Despite the entreaties of his class leader, Žifara, 
to behave appropriately, Arūnas ignored his responsibilities as a member of the 
communist Youth organization. instead, he left silly verses signed “Arberonas” 
around the school.2 On Saturday, the end of the week and of the novel, Arūnas’ 
* the research for this article was made possible by a Fulbright‑hays doctoral dissertation 
research Abroad grant and by a Foreign Language and Area Studies fellowship, both with 
funds provided by the united States department of education. the views presented in this 
article are mine and do not represent the position of the united States department of education. 
1. Vytautas Bubnys, Arberonas, Antras leidimas [Second edition], ed., (Vilnius: Vaga, 1972). 
Vytautas Bubnys (b. 1932) was a Soviet Lithuanian writer who published ten novels and worked for the journal Moksleivis [Pupil]. 
2. For example, “the voice that reaches the heavens comes from the biggest throat (į dangų balsas eina ne to, kuris turi didžiausią gerklę)” and “if a person is quiet, it does not mean that he has hooked a fish (jeigu žmogus tyli, dar nereiškia, kad jis žuvis ir užkibs ant kabliuko).” 
cahiers du monde russe, 54/3‑4, Juillet‑décembre 2013, p. 467‑490.
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father was rushed to the hospital. As he waited to hear about his father’s condition, 
Arūnas realized that he had been engaged in “childish games.” now the time had 
come to be an adult and take his life and responsibilities seriously. 
Two months after the ilm Mažoji Išpažintis began showing at the romuva 
theater in Kaunas, the second largest city in Soviet Lithuania, two thousand young 
people in their teens and early twenties took to the streets for two days of mass 
demonstrations. the demonstrations followed the funeral of romas Kalanta, a 
nineteen‑year‑old who had immolated himself on may 14 in the city center.3 As 
they marched through the streets on may 18, the young people shouted “freedom 
for Lithuania,” “freedom for youth,” and “freedom for hippies.” After several hours, 
the crowd was broken up by riot police. When a crowd again gathered in the city 
center on the following day, the authorities called in army troops to suppress the 
street demonstrations. Publicly, the Soviet authorities presented a clearly deined 
narrative about the events in mid‑may that portrayed Kalanta as mentally ill and 
cast the ensuing street demonstrations as the work of hooligans. In the only direct 
reference in the Soviet Lithuanian press, the may 20 issue of the Kaunas daily 
newspaper Kauno tiesa gave a brief report on Kalanta’s death and the “disturbance 
of public order” that followed his funeral. According to the newspaper, an oficial 
commission determined that Kalanta “committed suicide while in a morbid state.” 
the article further stated that the demonstrations that followed Kalanta’s death 
were a disturbance of the public order caused by “a small group of parasitical youth 
[who were] incited by irresponsible individuals.”4 
in the aftermath of the may 1972 events, young people who participated in 
the street demonstrations and local Communist oficials employed language of 
youthful immaturity similar to that used in the novel and the ilm to explain what 
had happened on the streets of Kaunas. Participants insisted in statements to the 
KgB that they had acted only out of “curiosity,” thereby declaiming personal 
responsibility for their involvement in an unsanctioned mass demonstration. the 
authorities began with a narrative that focused on the corrupting inluence of Western 
cultural practices and ended with an emphasis on the “immaturity” of Soviet youth 
who failed to recognize their own responsibilities in communist society. Although 
Each piece of paper ended with “what do you think? (Ką dabar galvoji?)” and was signed 
“Arberonas.” “Arberonas” is a meaningless word formed in part by the two friends’ names 
Arūnas and Benas.
3. Along with his coat, Kalanta left on a bench a notebook in which he wrote “The system alone 
is responsible for my death (dėl mano mirties kalta tik santvarka).” His family and friends said at the time – and again after Lithuania regained independence – that Kalanta did not discuss his 
plan to immolate himself nor had he indicated that he was suicidal. Kalanta was not actively 
involved in any “hippie” groups or dissident activities at the time of his death. Local Soviet authorities declared that he suffered from schizophrenia; although this diagnosis was rejected 
by an official psychiatric commissioned convened in 1989.
4. “Kauno miesto prokuratūroje” [From the Kaunas City Prosecutor]. Kauno tiesa [Kaunas 
truth], may 20, 1972, 6. the psychiatric commission’s report, as well as examples of Kalanta’s 
“writings and drawings,” are contained in files of the investigation of his self‑immolation. “Baudžiamoji byla Nr. 20‑2‑036‑72 dėl Romo Kalantos mirties fakto [Criminal Case 
nr. 20‑2‑036‑72 on the Fact of romas Kalanta’s death],” may‑June 1972. 
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the novel and the ilm appear to present a stagnant discourse of what constituted 
proper Communist values and a condemnation of the inluence of Western cultural 
practices on Soviet youth, the events on the streets in Kaunas revealed the fault 
lines of negotiations between authorities and youth over the acceptable boundaries 
of Soviet youth’s cultural practices and social responsibilities in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. 
Soviet Lithuania
The collapse of the Russian empire in World War  I provided the opportunity for 
some twenty leaders of the Lithuanian national movement to declare an independent 
republic of Lithuania in 1918. A mere twenty years later, the onset of world 
War II led to the loss of Lithuanian independent statehood. Secret protocols to the 
1939 nazi‑Soviet non‑Aggression Pact assigned Lithuania to the Soviet sphere of 
inluence. In December 1939, Lithuania acceded to Soviet demands to station Red 
Army troops on Lithuanian territory. A Soviet ultimatum for the formation of a 
“pro‑Soviet government” in Lithuania on June 14, 1940, led to the establishment of a 
“People’s government,” which requested annexation by the Soviet union, and to the 
deportation of approximately 10% of the Lithuanian population in 1941. the return of 
Soviet troops in January 1945 after four years of nazi german occupation consolidated 
the initial incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet union. thousands of Lithuanians 
retreated with the germany army and ended up in displaced persons camps at the end 
of the war. they eventually immigrated to the united States, canada, Australia or 
Western Europe. Although partisan bands took to the forests and attempted to resist 
militarily the Soviet occupation, they were not able to sustain control of Lithuanian 
territory and most laid down their arms under an amnesty granted after Stalin’s death 
in 1953. By the 1960s, Lithuanians lived, were educated and worked within oficial 
Soviet social structures, with little evidence of active resistance to Soviet rule.5 Unlike 
its neighbors Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania did not experience an inlux of Russian 
in‑migration during the Soviet period. the republic’s population remained at 80% 
ethnic Lithuanians, with Poles as the largest ethnic minority (12%). 
in many ways, Kaunas was a typical provincial Soviet city in 1972 and the 
young people who lived there were typical Soviet youth. the city saw a forty 
percent population increase from 219,300 in 1959 to 306,200 in 1970.6 As a 
result of urbanization and the Soviet housing drive, young people in Kaunas grew 
up in apartment buildings and spent much of their leisure time socializing with 
5. the 1970s saw the growth of resistance activities in Lithuania, including a broad‑based 
catholic dissident movement and numerous human rights dissidents. See, for example, thomas Remeikis, opposition to Soviet rule in Lithuania, 1945‑1980 (chicago: institute of Lithuania Studies Press, 1980) and V. Stanley Vardys, the catholic church, dissent and nationality in 
Soviet Lithuania (Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly; distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 1978).
6. romualdas neimantas, Kaunas (Vilnius: mintis Publishers, 1982), 34.
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other youth in the same housing block. The “courtyard culture” of young people 
in Kaunas meant that access to cultural artifacts and practices were shared across 
social and ethnic boundaries. Although it was a provincial Soviet city, Kaunas did 
have greater access to western cultural products than other similar Soviet cities. 
Few foreigners traveled to Kaunas, but the number of residents with relatives living 
abroad was higher than many other Soviet cities.7 Kaunas had served as the interwar 
capital of Lithuania and the center of political and cultural life. As a result, a large 
percentage of its population had led to the West with the return of the Soviet Army 
in 1944. By the 1960s, these émigrés were now sending packages of jeans, rock 
albums and magazines to their relatives who remained in Kaunas. 
Sources and methodology8
Although the may 1972 events are regularly discussed in the post‑1990 Lithuanian 
popular press, Kalanta’s death and the ensuing street demonstrations have received 
limited attention by scholars of Lithuanian or Soviet history. the main scholarly 
work on Kaunas May 1972 was conducted for a conference at Vytautas Magnus 
university in 2002 at the thirtieth anniversary of the events.9 Scholars looked at 
various aspects of the may 1972 street demonstrations, including KgB accounts 
of the events, the LicP’s response, the response in the west and the relationship 
between cultural and ideological movements in the west and the events in Kaunas. 
that same year, a collection of essays and primary documents was published by 
two historians at Vytautas magnus university.10 These works provide an important 
foundation for scholarship on the 1972 street demonstrations; however, they serve 
as preliminary assessments that were not later fully developed by these scholars 
(all of whom have pursued research agendas other than the 1972 events).
When they are mentioned in English‑language works on the Soviet Union, the 
1972 events in Kaunas are cited as examples of nationalist and/or anti‑Soviet feeling 
7. Kaunas was opened to one‑day visitors in 1970. According to documents in the Kaunas city 
KgB Section files, 150 tourists from capitalist countries visited Kaunas in 1972. the document did not indicate when these visits took place (i.e., before or after the May events). Kaunas City KGB Section Files, Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti pri Soviete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR. 1973. KGB Skyrius, Lietuvos Ypatingas Archyvas [KGB Division, Special Archives of 
Lithuania]. Vilnius. Fondas K‑1, Ap. 1, By. 159. (Accessed Spring 2009).
8. in addition to archival sources discussed in this section, i conducted interviews in 2010 and 
2011 with participants and observers of the 1972 street demonstrations. these interviews, 
conducted nearly forty years after the events were used primarily in this article to describe 
youth cultural practices at the time.
9. Articles from the conference were published as a special issue of Kauno Istorijos Metraštis [Kaunas History Yearbook] 4, (2003). Also, Arvydas Anušauskas, “KGB reakcija į 1972 
įvykius [The KGB reaction to the 1972 events],” Genocidas ir Rezistencija, 13, 1 (2003): 
80‑83, which was originally presented at the same conference as those published in the 2003 
special issue of Kauno Istorijos Metraštis.
10. Egidijus Aleksandravičius and Salius Žukas, eds., Romo Kalantos auka: 1972 metų Kauno 
pavasaris [Romas Kalanta’s Sacrifice: Kaunas Spring 1972] (Vilnius: Baltos Lankos, 2002).
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in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist republic (LiSSr), yet without an analysis of 
their origins or of their deeper political and social consequences.11 Vladimir Kozlov 
does not mention the events in Kaunas in his extensive work on popular protest in 
the Soviet union. Yet the street demonstrations in Kaunas manifested a number 
of characteristics of mass popular protest he identiied in other republics. Kozlov 
argues that popular protest was more frequent in the 1960s because Soviet citizens 
still believed that the promised bright future was possible; therefore, perceived 
abuses of power created a sense of violation among Soviet citizens. As a result, 
unrest on the part of a small group of people in an urban setting could quickly turn 
into a popular protest. As happened in Kaunas, bystanders at events in other Soviet 
republics either formed a “passively empathetic crowd” or were drawn into the 
protest.12 Kozlov points out that not all Soviet citizens had the capacity to engage in 
more sophisticated methods of communicating their discontent with Soviet abuses 
of power (such as letters to editors or complaint letters to speciic agencies). Those 
who did not have such capacity, such as high school students or young workers, 
could be drawn into other forms of protest, for example, street demonstrations, that 
expressed an outcry against injustices.13 chants of “down with the police and their 
bananas” in the Kaunas street demonstrations certainly indicated that young people 
were responding to a perceived abuse of power by the police.14 
Although the young people on the streets in Kaunas in 1972 chanted “freedom 
for Lithuania,” nationalist language was only one way of framing their discontent 
with the existing system. indeed, reports of the demonstrations equally describe the 
chanting as focused on youth, with cries of “freedom for youth” and even “freedom 
for hippies.” Kozlov argues that the reasons for protest and the language available 
to express discontent were not always aligned. he points out that popular protest in 
Soviet central Asia against widespread violations of legality were often tinged with 
anti‑Russian grafiti.15 In the same way, Saulius Grybkauskas demonstrates that 
worker‑manager tensions in Soviet Lithuanian enterprises in the 1960s and 1970s 
were frequently framed in nationalist language even if the points of conlict were 
economic and employment‑related.16 
11. examples include Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet dissent: contemporary movements for 
national, religious, and human rights, trans., carol Pearce and John glad (middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1985); Mark Beissinger, nationalist mobilization and the 
collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Ben Fowkes, 
the disintegration of the Soviet union: A Study in the rise and triumph of nationalism (new York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). 
12. Vladimir A.  Kozlov, mass uprisings in the uSSr: Protest and rebellion in the 
Post‑Stalin Years, trans., Elaine McClarnand MacKinnon (London; Armonk, NY: 
m.e. Sharpe, 2002), 161.
13. ibid.
14. “Bananas” was a slang term for rubber truncheons.
15. Kozlov, mass uprisings in the uSSr, 306‑307.
16. Saulius Grybkauskas, Sovietinė nomenklatūra ir pramonė Lietuvoje 1965‑1985 metais [The Soviet Nomenklatura and Industry in Lithuania 1965‑1985] (Vilnius: Lietuvos Istorijos Instituto Leidykla, 2011).
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An analysis of KgB interrogation statements of young people who participated in 
the street demonstrations reveals the political practices through which young people 
deined their relationship to post‑Stalinist Soviet authority and society. Of the four 
hundred and two people arrested on May 18, the KGB investigation iles contain 
interview statements (liudytojo apklausos protokolas) from ifty‑two individuals 
who participated to some extent in the street demonstrations.17 KgB interview 
statements are, of course, problematic sources. while investigative reports state the 
total number arrested, there are no full lists of arrested individuals in the investigation 
iles. There is no indication why these ifty‑two statements are the only ones extant 
or of what kind of duress might have been applied to the young people who were 
questioned. despite these concerns, a careful analysis of the statements can still 
provide certain types of information about the young people who participated and 
how they talked to authorities about the nature of the street demonstrations and their 
participation in them. Of the ifty‑two people whose interview statements are in the 
iles, forty were teen agers, while twelve were twenty years old or older.18 Seventeen 
of the young people were members of the communist Youth organization, while 
one was a candidate member of the communist Party.19 the remaining thirty‑four 
were identiied as “nepartinis [not afiliated with the Communist Party].” Sixteen 
were female; thirty‑six were male. All of those questioned were residents of Kaunas. 
the statements demonstrate that young Lithuanians born and raised in post‑Stalinist 
Soviet Union had learned to “speak Bolshevik,” using contemporary Soviet 
ideological language for their own purposes.20
communist Party reports and transcripts of speeches at Party activist meetings 
in the immediate aftermath of the street demonstrations establish that local 
Communist Party oficials were searching for an ideologically acceptable narrative 
17. “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72]”, May‑July 1972. The statements rarely indicate what questions were asked, although it is possible to infer certain 
questions based on common elements contained in the statements. the statements were 
primarily handwritten, presumably by a KgB official or stenographer because the handwriting 
for many of the statements is the same. each statement is signed at the end by the person from whom it was taken. Several of the individuals were interviewed two or three times with a 
statement from each interview. 
18. the three oldest participants for which there are interrogation statements were 24, 27, and 
28. the interrogation statements represent a younger demographic than the statistics provided 
by the KgB for the total 402 people who were arrested. For the extant interrogation statements, 
over one‑third were under 18 and nearly half were age 18‑21. KgB reports stated that, of those 
arrested for participation in the street demonstrations, 25% were under age 18, 17% were age 
18‑21, and 28% were 21‑25. 
19. At one‑third, the percentage of communist Youth organization members in the extant 
interrogation statements was higher than the one‑quarter with party affiliation of the 
402 people arrested.
20. For work on “speaking Bolshevik” during the Stalinist period, see Stephen Kotkin, 
magnetic mountain: Stalinism as a civilization (Berkeley – Lost Angeles: University of California Press, 1995) and Jochen Hellbeck, revolution on my mind: writing a diary under 
Stalin (cambridge, mA: harvard university Press, 2006). For young people’s capacity to use Soviet forms of speaking in late socialism, see Alexei Yurchak, everything was Forever, until 
it was no more: the Last Soviet generation (Princeton, nJ: Princeton university Press, 2006).
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of the events. Like KGB documents, LiCP documents are also problematic. It is 
not clear to what extent speeches given to the Party faithful and reports sent up the 
chain of command as far as moscow accurately represent Lithuanian communist 
authorities’ opinions about the causes of the may 1972 street demonstrations. 
Again, despite these concerns, a close reading of the documents reveals the ways in 
which the local authorities chose from among a repertoire of ideological language 
to explain what had happened on the streets of Kaunas.
“really existing socialism”
“Really existing socialism” was a key ideological constraint within which the 
Communist Party of Lithuania (LiCP) had to work as it crafted a narrative of 
the events of May 18‑19. As a result, the Communist Party rejected nationalist, 
class and generational conlicts as the cause of participation by two thousand 
young people in mass demonstrations in Kaunas. In a speech on June 2, Antanas 
guiga, First Secretary of the Kaunas district Party organization, denied that the 
demonstrations had a nationalist character, “inasmuch as the majority of participants 
were young men of Lithuanian nationality, but there were also russians, Jews, and 
others.”21 Communist oficials had reason to be concerned that events in the LiSSR 
would be labeled “nationalist.” Soviet‑wide economic and political reforms had 
created tension between center and periphery that tapped into existing concerns in 
moscow about nationalist tendencies in the Baltic Soviet Socialist republics and 
resulted in greater exercise of control by the central leadership. the Lithuanian 
leadership had been subjected to accusations that “nationalist elements” attempted 
to “preach localism,” “mislead individual oficials into discrimination on the basis 
of nationality in the cadres policy,” and “supplant the criticism of the cult of the 
individual by criticism of Leninism.” Attacks on Lithuanian “bourgeois nationalism” 
appeared both in Pravda and Voprosi Filosoii [Questions of Philosophy].22
In the view of the Communist Party oficials, the street demonstrations following 
Kalanta’s self‑immolation were instead representative of a broader “youth problem” 
in the Soviet union. A may 30 LicP document put the events of may 18‑19 in the 
context of other incidents in which youth “behaved in a disorderly and undisciplined 
manner at music concerts, basketball games, boxing matches and other events.”23 
21. of the fifty‑two individuals for whom interrogation statements are available in the files, 
only three have identifiably russian names. the statistical summary provided by the KgB does 
not include ethnicity.
22. Teresa Rakowska‑Harmstone, “The Dilemma of Nationalism in the Soviet Union,” in John W. Strong, ed., the Soviet union under Brezhnev and Kosygin: the transition Years (New York: Van Nostrand Reihold Company, 1971), 122.
23. “Postanovlenie biuro tsentral´nogo komiteta KP Litvi ob usilenii politicheskoi i organizatorskoi raboti v sviazi s antiobshchestvennimi proiavleniiami v g. Kaunase [Decree concerning the need to strengthen political and administrative work in connection with the anti‑social developments in 
the city of Kaunas],” the central committee of the communist Party of Lithuania. may 30, 1972. LKP Skyrius, Lietuvos Ypatingas Archyvas [Communist Party of Lithuania Division, Special 
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In a June 2 speech, Lithuanian Komsomol Secretary Poškus emphasized that “the 
majority of the city’s young people has been, is now, and will continue to be faithful 
to their class duties in their daily work and affairs, proving their allegiance to the work 
of the communist Party.” he gave as an example the participation of young people 
from Soviet Lithuania in the march “through the places of revolutionary, Labor and 
military glory of the communist Party and the Soviet People,” which was praised by 
general Secretary Leonid Brezhnev at the communist Party of the Soviet union’s 
24th Party Congress. However, he decried the recent number of “anti‑social attacks” 
carried out by students of general education and professional technical schools, and in 
certain cases, by university students and working young people.24
At the same time, Communist oficials clearly distinguished youth problems 
in contemporary Soviet society from those in western capitalist societies. guiga 
emphasized that the events of may 18‑19
in no way bear a class character… Among those who participated in the violation of public order were young workers, students, the children of workers and service people, and even of kolkhoz workers, because most of the students 
from professional and technical schools come from rural areas.25
guiga also stated that 
Although some degree of disagreement is to be expected between children and 
their parents, and between younger people and older people, there exists no 
disagreement whatsoever about the fundamental issues of life and politics, and 
there is no such thing as a generation gap in our society.
These assurances, however, seemed to contradict Communist oficials’ explicitly 
articulated concerns about Soviet Lithuanian youth in the early 1970s.
concerns about a growing youth problem were intertwined with Soviet 
concerns with so‑called hooliganism. Since the 1950s, “hooliganism” had been 
constructed in the media as the primary social problem among youth. The lexible 
category of petty hooliganism introduced under Khrushchev made it easier for 
Soviet authorities to prosecute and intimidate Soviet citizens.26 From 1960 on, 
Archives of Lithuania], Vilnius. Fondas 1771, Ap. 247, By. 79. (Accessed 2009). Although the 
speech does not identify specific details, incidents that fit this list have been reported in other sources. For example, disturbances followed a boxing match between Lithuanian and Uzbek teams in July 1960. Romuald J.  Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, the Baltic States: Years of 
dependence, 1940‑1990, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
24. “Protokol No. 3.”
25. “Protokol No. 3 sobraniia gorodskogo partiinogo aktiva [Meeting of the city Party activists],” Communist Party of Lithuania. June 2, 1972. LKP Skyrius, Lietuvos Ypatingas 
Archyvas [communist Party of Lithuania division, Special Archives of Lithuania], Vilnius. 
Fondas 3110, Ap. 61, By. 15. (Accessed 2009).
26. Brian Lapierre, “Making Hooligans on a Mass Scale,” cahiers du monde russe, 47, 1‑2 
(2006): 373.
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the criminal code deined hooliganism as “intentional actions that rudely violate 
public order and express clear disrespect for society.”27 campaigns against 
hooliganism saturated Soviet society in the 1960s and the number of people 
prosecuted for hooliganism rose steeply. the campaign against hooliganism 
was part and parcel of the post‑Stalinist transition from social control through 
violence to social control through discipline. By attempting to exercise control 
of everyday behaviors such as public socializing and interactions between fellow 
citizens, the state further blurred the line between personal and private. the Soviet 
authorities’ goal in prosecuting hooliganism was to create a society that relected 
the ideals of “really‑existing socialism,” a society in which Soviet people acted in 
civilized ways that beneited the collective.
the communist Youth organization (Komsomol in Russian; Komjaunimas 
in Lithuanian) served as the key force to exert Soviet control over young people, 
especially those like the ictional Arūnas gulbinas who engaged in western cultural 
practices. in his speech to the 24th Party congress, Brezhnev emphasized that
The Komsomol’s central task has been and remains to bring up young people 
in the spirit of communist ideals and devotion to our Soviet motherland, in 
the spirit of internationalism, and actively to propagate the norms and cultural 
values of our society.28 
As the Komsomol increasingly assumed responsibility for the ideological 
training of young people it became more and more a mass organization of social 
control.29 Indeed, membership in oficial groups, including the Communist 
Youth organization, continued to provide the most reliable access to recreation, 
higher education and jobs—and young Lithuanians participated in Komsomol 
and other oficial activities or groups throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. The 
total membership of the Lithuanian communist Youth organization more than 
doubled from 1960 to 1965, growing from 131,012 to 226,311. it continued to 
increase, rising to 281,853 in 1971 (a 46% increase from 1960).30 over the same 
period, the total LiSSr population increased by 15%, from 2,711,000 in 1959 to 
27. ibid., 349, Footnote 1. “there were two types of criminal hooliganism differentiated 
according to seriousness and punishment: simple hooliganism (prostoe khuliganstvo), 
for which punishments ranged from fines to one year in prison, and malicious hooliganism 
(zlostnoe khuliganstvo), for which prison sentences ranged from three to five years.”
28. report of the cPSu central committee to the 24th congress of the communist Party of 
the Soviet union, delivered by Leonid Brezhnev, general Secretary of the cPSu central 
committee, march 30, 1971, 93‑94.
29. Hilary Pilkington, “‘The Future Is Ours’: Youth Culture in Russia, 1953 to the Present,” 
in catriona Kelly, david Shepherd, eds., russian cultural Studies: An introduction (oxford: 
oxford university Press, 1998), 370‑371.
30. Lietuvos Komjaunimas skaičiais 1919‑1979 statistikos duomenų rinkinys (Vilnius: mintis, 1980), 68, 70. There was, however, a sharp drop off in the total number of new Komjaunimas 
members in Lithuania from 1965 (43,346) to 1966 (32,235). the annual new membership 
numbers then increased significantly over the next five years, reaching 42,496 in 1971.
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3,128,000 in 1970.31 Kaunas, in particular, saw steadily increasing numbers of new 
Komsomol members, from 34,838 in 1965 to 41,350 in 1971.32 the 19% increase 
in Komsomol membership, however, was outpaced by the 40% population growth in 
Kaunas over the same time period.33
Kaunas as a site of Soviet youth cultural practices
Like urban youth across the Soviet Union in the late 1960s and early 1970s, young 
people in Kaunas engaged in youth cultural practices that pushed the boundaries 
of acceptable leisure activities.34 Access to images of the West through ilm and 
television, music of the west through short‑wave radio broadcasts, and material 
goods from the west brought in by tourists and received by mail from relatives 
living abroad meant that youth lifestyles and cultural practices in Soviet cities came 
to resemble more closely those of their counterparts in the west. the adoption and 
adaptation of Western cultural practices in Soviet Lithuania was inluenced by a 
number of factors. Firstly, access to information was circumscribed. Films and 
other visual artifacts were not necessarily direct portrayals of western lifestyles or 
leisure activities. Young people saw photographs of hippies and youth in the west 
primarily through Soviet anti‑western propaganda, which often presented extreme 
portrayals of dress and cultural practices. Looks and practices drawn from foreign 
ilms might already be outdated in the West. For example, the 1960 American ilm 
the Apartment was not shown in Kaunas until a decade later when clothing styles 
in the united States had already changed. Soviet youth had to recreate western 
clothing styles using materials at hand. 
Among all the inluences of Western culture, rock music was at the core 
of what many young people saw as a modern lifestyle. Young people in Soviet 
Lithuania listened to rock music primarily on BBC and Radio Luxembourg.35 they 
eagerly awaited the latest song by the doors, Jimi hendrix, creedence clearwater 
31. T.  Shabad, “The 1979 Census and Some Demographic Trends in the Soviet Union,” 
geoJournal 4, 1 (1980): 85.
32. Lietuvos Komjaunimas skaičiais 1919‑1979 statistikos duomenų rinkinys, 98.
33. romualdas neimantas, Kaunas (Vilnius: mintis Publishers, 1982), 34.
34. A number of scholars have documented the flourishing of youth culture and particularly 
the influence of western cultural practices on Soviet youth. See, for example, John Bushnell, 
moscow graffiti: Language and Subculture (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990); Pilkington, “‘The Future Is Ours’…”; Donald J. Raleigh, Soviet Baby Boomers: An oral history of russia’s cold 
war generation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); William J. Risch, “Soviet ‘Flower 
children’. hippies and the Youth counter‑culture in 1970s L´viv,” Journal of contemporary 
history, 40, 3 (2005); Alexei Yurchak, everything was Forever, until it was no more: the 
Last Soviet generation (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006); Sergei I. Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk, 
1960‑1985 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010).
35. Voice of America was considered the “jazz station” by Lithuanians whom I interviewed 
in 2010.
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revival, and the Animals.36 The Polish rock band czerwone gitary [red guitars] 
was also popular. Listening to rock music did indeed become a pursuit that drew 
young people out of the orbit of oficial recreational activities for youth. Young 
people in Kaunas would gather in homes and listen to rock music on the radio, 
on home‑made recordings or on albums sent by relatives living abroad.37 Young 
people also made rock music. Teenagers, primarily young men, copied the music 
they heard on the radio or on albums from the West. Informal jam sessions in 
homes led to the formation of amateur bands. Ričardas Kolaitis, who formed the 
band decima with several classmates, explained that they would listen to radio 
Luxemborg and practice playing their favorite songs.38 Because they did not speak 
english, they did not understand the lyrics. over time, the band began to write their 
own lyrics in Lithuanian to the melodies that they learned from the radio.39 decima 
played together from 1968 to 1972. the band played at local youth functions in 
Kaunas, although they never received formal recognition. 
Faced with the inlux of rock music from the West, Soviet authorities allowed 
“vocal‑instrumental ensembles” (ViAs) in an attempt to produce ideologically 
acceptable music that would appeal to young people. these bands were expected 
to play a strict Soviet repertoire and while “they could be youthful, electriied, 
even shaggy‑haired,” Soviet authorities were quite clear that ViAs were not 
“rock bands.”40 musicians in ViAs received professional status and were paid for 
performing, unlike the many amateur bands that lourished at the time. No matter 
how they were oficially described, young people viewed the amateur bands and 
ViAs involved in the Kaunas music scene in the late 1960s and early 1970s as 
rock bands.41 Aitvarai [Kites] (1967‑1976) was formed by students in the Kaunas 
Polytechnic Institute’s Construction Department. The group irst performed in 
the 1967 KPi student festival. they toured outside of Lithuania to Latvia, Poland, 
Ukraine, Armenia and East Germany in the early 1970s. The band gelės [Flowers] 
(1970‑1972) coincidentally played its inal concert on May 14, 1972, in the town 
of Kėdainai. gintarėliai [Amber People] (1966‑1973) began as a Beatles cover 
36. Although much has been written about the influence of the Beatles in the Soviet union, they did not rank high in my interviewees’ lists of favorite bands. The Beatles craze entered the Soviet Union in the early 1960s. See, for example, Leslie Woodhead, “How the Beatles Rocked 
the Kremlin,” (uK: 2009).
37. Ričardas Gužas (Kaunas, Lithuania; April 20, 2011). Interview with author; Ričardas Kolaitis (Kaunas; June 1, 2011). Interview with author; Hana Šumilaitė (Kaunas; July 7, 2011). 
interview with author.
38. Kolaitis (Kaunas; June 1, 2011). Interview with author.
39. this was a common practice by amateur bands in Soviet Lithuania. however, because these 
songs were rarely recorded and forty years has passed, most of the lyrics are lost. 
40. Kristin roth‑ey, moscow Prime time: how the Soviet union Built a media empire that 
Lost the cultural cold war (Ithaca – London: Cornell University Press, 2011), 165.
41. these bands were mentioned in interviews and also appear in Youtube videos of Soviet Lithuanian “rock music.” Details about the individual bands comes from the encyclopedia Mindaugas Peleckis, ed. Lietuvos Rokas: ištakos ir raida [Lithuanian Rock: Origins and 
evolution] (Vilnius: mintis, 2011).
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band and later represented the Soviet union abroad, playing concerts in Finland, 
the uK and the congo. the band Kertukai [the tough guys] (1966‑1971) was the 
only local Kaunas band to receive oficial designation as a VIA. The hippie group 
“The Company” even generated its own rock band, raganiai [Sorcerers] (1969‑1972). 
A number of amateur rock bands in Kaunas attained semi‑formal status through the 
Kaunas Polytechnic institute.42 in 1967, students in KPi’s Automotive department 
formed an informal “big beat” fan club that met in a student’s apartment. the 
students registered the club as a KPI student group in 1969. Each week the group 
would gather at the institute to listen to records and record music on a magnetifon 
reel‑to‑reel tape recorder.43 The “big beat” club organized the irst rock concert in 
Kaunas – called a “pop session” – in the spring of 1971. KPI’s student‑run pop club 
continued to organize concerts and dances in the early 1970s.44 
Kids on the streets: young people explain their actions
these multi‑faceted and thriving youth cultural practices provided the context in 
which young people responded to Kalanta’s suicide by gathering at his family’s 
home and the site of his self‑immolation on the afternoon of his funeral. their 
demands for “freedom for youth” and “freedom for hippies,” along with “down 
with the police and their bananas,” indicated a desire to push further the boundaries 
of acceptable Soviet youth cultural practices. An analysis of KgB interrogation 
statements of young people who participated in the street demonstrations reveals 
that these young people saw themselves as participating primarily in an event that 
manifested a common identity as youth.45 
42. According to the great Soviet encyclopedia 3rd edition, “in 1972 the Kaunas Polytechnic 
institute included departments of automation, engineering economics, light industry, 
machine building, mechanics, radio electronics, electrical engineering, chemical technology, 
construction and sanitation engineering, as well as evening, correspondence and preparatory divisions […] In the 1972–73 academic year the institute had 15, 000 students, with 
1,000 instructors […]” Bol´shaia Sovetskaia entsiklopediia [great Soviet encyclopedia] 3rd ed. (M., 1969–1978), s.v. “Kaunas Polytechnic Institute.” (www.rubricon.com, accessed online 
January 2013).
43. Interview with Antanas Stancevičius, Algimintas Piligrimas, and Algimintas Šešelgis, pop club members in Enrika Striogaitė and rimantė tamoliūmienė, eds., Laisvės proveržiai sovietiniame Kaune nuo slapto pogrindžio iki atviro protesto [Breakthrough of freedom in Soviet Lithuania from secret underground to open protest] (Kaunas: Kauno Apskrities Viešoji Biblioteka, 2007), 97‑101.
44. Edmundas Janušaitis (Kaunas; February 2, 2011). Interview with author; Kolaitis (Kaunas; June 1, 2011). Interview with author; Aurelijus Varnas (Kaunas; February 7, 2011). Interview 
with author.
45. All interrogation statements cited by first name and last initial in the following footnotes are taken from the investigation files in Baudžiamoji Byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72], Kauno Miesto VK VRV (Vidaus Reikalū Vadybos) Tardymo Skyrius [Investigation section of Kaunas Internal Affairs Department] Lietuvos TSR Prokuratūra 
(Ypatingai Svarbių Bylų Tardytojas) [LiSSR Prosecutor.] May‑July 1972. KGB Skyrius, 
Lietuvos Ypatingas Archyvas [KgB division, Special Archives of Lithuania], Vilnius. Fondas 
K‑1, Ap. 58a, By. 47644/3 (five volumes). (Accessed January 2009). 
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references to actions that could be deemed “nationalist” did appear in 
descriptions of the street demonstrations, but were downplayed by participants. one 
young woman said that “Lietuva [Lithuania]” was spelled out with lowers at the 
place where Kalanta had immolated himself.46 Several people stated that the crowd 
sang Lithuanian national songs, although they also reported that the crowd did not 
know the words and the singing died out.47 Some observers attributed nationalist 
motivations to the crowd. A twenty‑two year old worker described a balding 
man, approximately forty years old, who “had great joy that there are still young 
Lithuanian patriots.”48 Despite these examples, the majority of those interviewed 
did not emphasize nationalist motivations on the part of the crowd. they reported 
that the crowd shouted “freedom for hippies” and “freedom for youth” as frequently 
as “freedom for Lithuania.” 
while some participants reported political aspects to the protest, these were 
similarly deemphasized in the statements taken by KGB interrogators. According 
to several of the interrogation statements, members of the crowd shouted “we don’t 
like Soviet authority; we will ight for freedom” and “we will ight for freedom 
and independence.”49 none of the young people who were questioned, however, 
claimed political motivations for themselves or for the majority of participants. 
A young man stated, “while watching the others, not the hippies, i understood that 
they approved of the shouted slogans only sort of as joking. I didn’t see political 
content in those shouts.”50 As evident from this quote, many of the participants 
associated the street demonstrations with the hippies, even though they themselves 
were not hippies. Most of those questioned who were at the Kalanta home identiied 
a “young man with long hair” as the instigator of the march to the city center. when 
questioned about the main actors during the impromptu memorial service and the 
march to the police headquarters, others also identiied young men with long hair 
or unnamed hippies as the instigators. the young people who were questioned 
attributed to the hippies a desire for social and personal freedom, not solely 
political freedom. An eleventh grade student explained, “i understood the shouts 
to mean that hippies felt freedom, which is similar to anarchy, was a necessity.”51 
An eighteen year old worker noted “I understood ‘hippie’ as youth with long hair or 
behaving freely (behaving how they want).”52
even given an incentive to downplay nationalist or political intentions, 
descriptions of the street demonstrations as a youth event still took center stage in 
the interrogation statements. A tenth grade student described that “there were girls 
46. Birutė Š., “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
47. Birutė Š. and Vytautas P., “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
48. Albertas K.,“Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
49. Viktoras Š., “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
50. Rimas G., “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
51. ibid.
52. Kęstutis P., “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
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and guys more or less my age […] i understood that a youth demonstration was 
occurring.”53 Several of the participants reported that members of the crowd called 
for a recognition of youth. A eleventh grade student said that individuals laying 
lowers in the park called on youth to gather every May 14 and declared that this 
date would be Lithuanian youth’s liberty day.54 Another student said that that the 
crowd shouted “Let this place unite as a symbol of youth.”55 Although they did not 
explicitly refer to previous altercations between the police and young people, many 
of those questioned noted that the crowd shouted “down with the police and their 
bananas,” providing an indication that there had been previous run‑ins between 
young people and the police.56 
despite evidence of thriving youth cultural practices in Kaunas that pushed the 
boundaries of acceptable Soviet activities, the young people detained after the street 
demonstrations were – perhaps not surprisingly – unwilling to push boundaries in 
their interrogation statements. the participants denied that they had done anything 
wrong by simply being present on the street, even when identifying the events as a 
protest against the Soviet system. in doing so, they used language that downplayed 
responsibility for their actions and mimicked the characterization of young people 
as “childish” found in the novel Arberonas and the ilm Mažoji Išpažintis.
nearly all of the young people explained to the authorities that they themselves 
only participated in the demonstrations out of curiosity. Young people with no 
personal connection to Kalanta were drawn to his funeral out of curiosity about 
the young man who had committed suicide so dramatically. one young woman 
explained that she was not employed or in school so she had free time and was 
curious to see the funeral. once at the Kalanta home, she went with the crowd to 
the city park because she wanted to see what would happen.57 A seventeen year 
old worker said simply that the funeral of a young man was interesting to her so 
she decided to attend.58 Both Kalanta’s self‑immolation and the date and time of 
the funeral were common knowledge in Kaunas by Thursday, May 18. A tenth 
grade pupil said, “I knew from people talking that Kalanta’s funeral would occur 
on may 18 at 16:00 and i decided to attend his funeral. i wanted to see what would 
53. Ričardas T., “buvo merginos ir vaikinai maždaug mano amžiaus […] supratau kad vyksta jaunimo demonstracija.” “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
54. Eugenijus Ž., “taip pat sakė, kad reikia jaunimui susrinkti kiekvienais metais gėgužės 14 d. prie susideginimo vietos ir, kad ta diena bus Lietuvos jaunimo laisvės diena.” “Baudžiamoji 
byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [criminal case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
55. Ričardas T., “tegul ta vieta būria jaunimo simboliu.” “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 
[criminal case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
56. LicP documents refer to incidents in which young people “behaved in a disorderly and undisciplined manner at music concerts, basketball games, boxing matches and other events.” 
Such interactions in the context of leisure activities reveal a potentially broad‑based youth 
discontent in Soviet Lithuania. “Postanovleniie.” 
57. Janina J., “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
58. Nadiedža M. Despite this young woman’s Russian first and last names, her interrogation statement was taken in Lithuanian. “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 
09‑2‑013‑72]”.
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happen so I also went to the city park.”59 Only a few participants said that they knew 
Kalanta personally. A young man, who was a member of the communist Party, 
said that he decided to go to the funeral because he was acquainted with Kalanta.60 
A student at the polytechnic school explained that he was in the same class with 
Kalanta from second through eleventh grade, therefore, he decided to attend his 
funeral. even those young people who said they attended the funeral because they 
knew Kalanta gave curiosity rather than personal connection as the reason for 
participating in the street demonstrations. when the crowd began to march to the 
city center, the polytechnic school student said “i went out of curiosity to see what 
else would happen.”61 
Based on the extant interrogation statements, the age of the participants was the 
primary attraction for young people who joined the crowd. A technical school student 
stated that “on that day, when i saw a large crowd of noisy youths, it personally 
interested me.”62 Similarly, an eleventh grade student said that “he went along with 
the kids.”63 A tenth grade student explained “i stood near the circle of shouting 
youths and I also shouted ‘long live the long‑haired ones [hippies]’.”64 A number of 
young people also remarked that joining with other young people was a liberating 
experience. As a worker declared, “It wasn’t important to me what the shouts meant; 
i was caught up in the spirit of the other shouters. it was interesting and cheerful. 
[i wanted] to be with the others […] to behave uninhibitedly and freely.”65 
the size of the crowd, which the young people repeatedly referred to as “huge” 
(didžiulis), drew many of the young people who had not gone to the Kalanta 
home but rather joined the crowd after seeing it on the street. Indeed, the crowd 
that gathered on Thursday, May 18, was the largest unoficial public gathering the 
young people would have seen or even heard about in Soviet Lithuania. in some 
cases, they noticed a crowd gathered outside the Kalanta home. one young man said 
that he saw a lot of people gathered at the Kalanta house after leaving work about 
3:30 in the afternoon and he went out of curiosity to see what was going on.66 in 
other cases, they noticed a crowd in the city center. Another, on his way home from 
work about 6:00 p.m. stated that he was surprised to see a lot of people gathered 
in the city park and went to see what was happening.67 An eleventh grade student 
explained that he went past the city park on his way home from school because 
59. Liuda A.  This young woman has a Russia first name and Lithuanian last name. Her interrogation statement was taken in Lithuanian. “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal 
case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
60. Vytautas K., “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
61. Viktoras M., “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
62. Vladas K., “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
63. Euginijus Ž., “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
64. Virginija S., “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
65. Nadiedža M., “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
66. Remigijus K., “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
67. Rimantas U.,“Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
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his house was nearby. He saw many young people placing lowers in the place 
where the self‑immolation had occurred so he went to see what was happening.68 
A student at a technical school stated that he was out walking around the city at 
about 4:30 p.m. When he walked past the Musical Theater, he saw a lot of people 
gathered and went to take a look.69 Similarly, a young worker said that he was 
on his way to visit a friend at about 4:00 p.m. He saw a crowd of people walking 
and shouting on Laisvės Alėja and he went along with the crowd.70 A student at a 
technical school saw a large crowd on Laisvės Alėja after leaving work and joined 
in as they marched to the police headquarters.71
in their explanations to the authorities, the young people claimed they were not 
doing anything wrong when they joined the crowd. Some argued that they weren’t 
actively participating, simply watching the event. A tenth grade pupil summed up 
the sentiments expressed by a number of those questioned, “neither i nor my friend 
[…] joined a disturbance against public order. We didn’t do anything bad and only 
looked at what happened.”72 Others acknowledged that they participated in the 
march and shouted slogans, but still denied that their actions were unacceptable. 
A young woman pointed out that she did not think that she was engaged in anything 
“bad [blogas]” when she joined the crowd in its march from the Kalanta home to 
the city center.73 Another student at a technical school also noted that he joined 
in the noise‑making without thinking that he did “something bad.”74 Since these 
statements appear in interrogation statements, it is dificult to determine if they 
express genuine opinions or are solely an attempt to downplay participation in an 
event that was clearly not acceptable to the authorities.
given the nearly unanimous use of “curiosity” as an explanation for participation, 
it is apparent that the young people believed that it was an acceptable explanation 
of their actions to give to authorities. As an eighth grade pupil stated “i have to note 
that i participated in the procession on may 18 only from curiosity and that i had 
no other aims.”75 certainly, young people who were acquainted with Kalanta would 
have had an incentive to downplay their personal connection with a young man 
who had publicly committed suicide and been declared mentally ill. curiosity also 
served to downplay political or nationalist motivations that might be unacceptable 
to authorities. At the same time, “curiosity” relects broader Soviet discourses about 
youth that equated behavior perceived as inappropriate with “immaturity.”
68. Rimas G.,“Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
69. Rimantas J., “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
70. Vytautas P., “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
71. Algimintas S., “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
72. Liuda A., “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
73. Audra K. This young woman has a Lithuanian first name and a Russian last name. Her interrogation statement is in Lithuanian. “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 
09‑2‑013‑72].”
74. Vladas K., “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
75. Ričardas D., “Baudžiamoji byla 09‑2‑013‑72 [Criminal Case 09‑2‑013‑72].”
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the LicP: searching for an ideologically acceptable narrative
Internal LiCP reports and speeches produced during the four weeks after 
Kalanta’s self‑immolation and the ensuing street demonstrations provide evidence 
that Communist Party oficials similarly deined the events of May 18‑19 as 
youth‑driven. in response to information from the KgB on the demographics of the 
young people who participated in the demonstrations, Communist party oficials 
constructed a narrative that posited “politically immature young people” spurred 
to “anti‑social actions” in the form of rioting by “anti‑Soviet and nationalist 
elements,” in particular the “so‑called hippies.” the tropes of “immature” youth 
corrupted by Western inluences that appear in the novel Arberonas and the ilm 
Mažoji Išpažintis appear in the LiCP‘s narrative of the events of May 18‑19. This 
characterization of young people as unthinkingly manipulated by outside forces 
rejected an interpretation of the events as a manifestation of real discontent.
A close analysis of LiCP documents reveals that Party oficials’ interpretation 
of the nature of the street demonstrations, the character of the participants, and 
the cause of their participation transitioned from blaming “marginal elements” in 
society to attributing the unrest to “politically immature” young people. A series 
of documents produced in the weeks after the street demonstrations – a May 20 
report on the measures taken by the Party in response to the events, a May report to 
the LicP central committee summarizing the events, a may 30 decree outlining 
measures to be taken in light of the events, speeches from a June 2 meeting of 
Party activists, and a June 14 speech by First Secretary Antanas Sniečkus to Party 
activists – demonstrate how the Communist Party’s interpretation of the events 
changed over time. the documents refer to “nationalist,” “anti‑Soviet” and “foreign 
bourgeois elements” taking advantage of the events, yet they do not designate these 
as the primary causes. while this narrative appears clear cut on the surface, it is 
fraught with ambiguity. Each interpretation in the documents – hooligans, hippies, 
and politically immature youth – had particular consequences for the political and 
social environment in Kaunas and for the communist Party as the ideological 
vanguard. Initially, Communist oficials had to explain what brought young people 
out into the streets in response to Kalanta’s self‑immolation. in doing so, they shied 
away from labeling the young people who participated in the street demonstrations 
as “nationalist” or “anti‑Soviet.” once the narrative based on politically immature 
youth had been constructed, they had to explain the causes of political immaturity 
among young people in Kaunas. the LicP construction of the events of may 18‑19 
downplayed explanations that might imply agency on the part of the young people 
who participated in the demonstrations. instead the LicP emphasized its own 
failure to inculcate young people with the proper attitudes and values, a response 
grounded in the Soviet practice of “self‑criticism.” 
In the irst report after the street demonstrations, Party oficials blamed 
hooligans for “disturbing the social order.” the may 20 report characterized the 
street demonstrations as “disorders” (besporiadki) and emphasized that participants 
included hippies, “a certain proportion of young non‑cadre workers, a number 
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of people with prior convictions and people who are not engaged in any kind of 
socially useful work.”76 given the saturation of the concept of “hooliganism” in 
the Soviet union, it is not surprising that participants in the street demonstrations 
in Kaunas were immediately labeled as “hooligans.” After all, two thousand young 
people in the streets refused to disperse when ordered to do so and the crowd had to 
be broken up by police. 
confronted with statistics of those arrested for participating in the demonstrations, 
Communist oficials could no longer write off the events as the actions of 
hooligans. the composition of the people who were arrested certainly differed from 
the characteristics put forth in the may 20 report. only 5% of those arrested were 
unemployed. Nearly half were workers and more than one‑third were students. Even 
more compelling, nearly one‑fourth were members of communist Youth League.77 
once the KgB investigation revealed the demographics of the participants in the 
street demonstrations, the language of hooliganism in LicP documents faded and 
nearly disappeared. in its description of the crowd that formed in the center on may 
18, the summary report makes reference to “certain criminal elements in the crowd” 
that engaged in vandalism, but these “petty criminals” played a small role given 
the scale of the unrest. in the June report and speeches, the term “hooligans” was 
only used when describing public responses to the events and not in descriptions 
of the young people on the street. For example, the June 2 report included the term 
“hooligan” once in a statement that “the absolute majority of the population […] 
condemns the hooligans.” Similarly, speeches by the communist Party leadership 
in June speeches commended the public for “correctly interpreting” the unrest as 
the work of “hooligans.”78 
Instead the LiCP focused on a second marginalized group – “hippies.” 
A summary report prepared by the LicP accused “so‑called hippies” for instigating 
the events and for corrupting young people. the report repeated a KgB allegation 
76. “Informatsiia o priniatikh merakh i provedennikh meropriiatiiakh Kaunasskim Gorkom I Gorraikomami Kp Litvi v sviazi s proisshestviiami v gorode Kaunase 14‑19 Maia 1972 g. [Information about measures and actions taken by the Kaunas municipal committee and the 
city district committees of the communist Party of Lithuania in connection with the events 
in the city of Kaunas on 14‑19 may 1972],” the central committee of the communist Party of Lithuania. May 20, 1972. LKP Skyrius, Lietuvos Ypatingas Archyvas [Communist 
Party of Lithuania division, Special Archives of Lithuania], Vilnius. Fondas 3110, Ap. 61, 
By. 34. (Accessed 2009). in Kozlov’s analysis of mass protest in the Soviet union, the term “besporiadki” is translated “disorders” or “disturbances.” I have adopted the same translation. Vladimir A. Kozlov, mass uprisings in the uSSr.
77. “Spravka ob antiobshchestvennikh i natsionalisticheskikh proiavlenniiakh v respublike imevshikh mesto posle 14  maia 1972 goda [Memorandum on anti‑social and nationalist manifestations that took place in the Republic after May 14, 1972],” Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti pri sovete ministrov Litovskoi SSR [LiSSR KGB]. June? 1972. Fondas K‑1 Ap. 3, By. 793, 154‑160. KGB Skyrius, Lietuvos Ypatingas Archyvas [KGB Division, Special 
Archives of Lithuania], Vilnius. (Accessed January 2009).
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that local hippies plotted to steal Kalanta’s body, giving this as the reason for 
changing the time of the funeral on may 18. According to the report,
the Kaunas city division used active measures to obtain information pointing to the intent of the so‑called “hippies” to gather together a signiicant number of their adherents to carry the deceased’s casket to the graveyard, and thence 
to protest by marching across the city to the place of his self‑immolation, lay lowers on the site, and hold a demonstration. Certain “hippies” had expressed 
their intent to seize the body of the suicide victim from his parents by force.79
the report noted that the funeral services “were carried out without incident” despite 
the threat. However, it accused “certain active followers of the ‘hippie’ movement’” 
(speciically Vytautas Kaladė and Antanas Kačinskas) of taking advantage of the 
crowd of young people who gathered at the Kalanta home at the originally scheduled 
time of the funeral and proposing a march to the city center. the summary report 
provided a preliminary conclusion that quoted directly from the KgB’s determination 
about the causes of the street demonstrations: “the initial instigators and active 
participants of the mass anti‑social demonstrations were young individuals, who 
mimicked the “so‑called ‘hippie’ movement.’” Young people’s desire to follow 
hippies had become a problem, according to the LicP report, because 
until recently, not enough attention has been paid by Soviet, Komsomol, and 
administrative entities to monitoring the activities of anti‑social elements and those who would emulate the ‘hippie’ movement, weak efforts have been made 
to conduct preventative propaganda efforts among them, and at the same time 
no warning was given about the harmful tendencies that have been developing 
among them.80
The May 30 Decree condemned the “harmful inluence of the so‑called ‘hippie’ 
followers, famous for their provocative disheveled appearance, known by their 
worship of the west, desire for vagrancy and their anarchistic attitude.”81 Like the 
attempt to accuse hooligans for the disturbance of public order, the designation of 
hippies as the culprit was undermined by the demographics of the young people 
on the streets, most of whom were not actively involved in the small Kaunas 
hippie movement. 
By early June, LiCP oficials emphasized not the hippies themselves but young 
people who were unduly inluenced by hippies in order to explain the massive 
79. “[untitled Summary report].” 
80. “[Untitled Summary Report].” Quoting the following KGB document: “Spravka [Memorandum],” Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR. 1972? Fondas K‑1 Ap. 3, By. 793, 142‑149. KGB Skyrius, Lietuvos Ypatingas Archyvas 
[KgB division, Special Archives of Lithuania], Vilnius. (Accessed January 2009).
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number of young people on the streets. This also marked a change from blaming 
active agents of unrest to blaming young people who were manipulated rather than 
expressing their own discontent. the summary report had emphasized that the 
crowd that gathered at the Kalanta home and carried out the “massive anti‑social 
demonstration” was primarily comprised of young people and concluded by labeling 
the young people as “politically immature.”82 in the may 30 report, communist 
authorities noted that the young people themselves did not consider their actions 
to be anti‑Soviet, which demonstrated that they were unaware of what constituted 
proper behavior.83 The June 2 speech by Lengvinas identiied the participants in the 
demonstrations as “young people who did not understand the signiicance of their 
actions and who had fallen for the provocations of ‘hippies’ and similar elements.”84
the communist leadership turned to the ideological upbringing of youth in 
order to understand why young people – especially those who were part of the 
Soviet system as workers, university and secondary school students, and Komsomol 
members – were susceptible to hippie inluence. During the weeks after the May 
18‑19 demonstrations, the term “unthinking” (or “unaware”) was used with 
increasing frequency to describe the young people on the streets. this designation 
draws on the Marxist‑Leninist meaning of a lack of “consciousness.” Unlike 
“apolitical,” this designation emphasized the failure of Soviet organizations to 
properly inculcate young people with communist values. Being “apolitical” could 
be prosecuted as an offense in the Soviet union because it implied an intentional 
rejection of Communism. “Political immaturity,” on the other hand, implied a lack 
of agency on the part of young people and instead held others responsible for their 
failure to act properly.
in the revised narrative of may 18‑19, the young people on the streets were 
not marginalized members of society; rather their “immaturity” led them to 
hooligan‑type actions. By June 2, Communist Party oficials had completely 
moved away from the language of “hooliganism” and instead attributed political 
immaturity as the deining characteristic of the young people on the street on May 
18‑19. While the speakers still referred to various “anti‑social elements” as a part 
of the events – hooligans and hippies speciically – their success in disturbing the 
public order was due to the “political immaturity” of young people who then fell 
under their inluence. In his speech to the Party activists on June 2, Kaunas City Party 
Secretary Lengvinas stated that the main participants in the “largely spontaneous” 
disturbances were “young people who did not understand the signiicance of their 
actions.” Lengvinas described the events as “anti‑social demonstrations and the 
hooliganish actions of a group of politically immature people.”85 in his speech on 
June 2, Lithuanian Komsomol Secretary Poškus said “we have encountered cases 
82. “[untitled Summary report].”
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where young students do not know and do not understand what political vigilance 
and commitment to principle mean. They connect, judging by what they themselves 
say on the issue, anti‑Soviet activities with mere bad behavior.”86
if the composition of the crowd meant that the authorities could not blame 
hooligans or hippies as they had initially attempted to do, the decision to identify 
“politically immature” youth as the cause of the popular unrest was rooted in the 
discursive possibilities available to Communist Party oficials. As the vanguard 
in the transformation of Soviet society and the only party in the Soviet union, 
the communist Party alone had the responsibility for identifying and eliminating 
its own laws. The characterization of the participants as young people whom 
the educational and Party structures had failed to properly inculcate with Soviet 
norms and values was consistent with the Soviet practice of “self‑criticism.” 
rather than emphasizing an individual Party member’s activity, Soviet 
self‑criticism involved “collective criticism by Party members of the weaknesses 
of the Party.” It involved an often perfunctory claim that the laws resulted in part 
from “not having worked hard enough.”87 LicP leaders engaged in the practice of 
“self‑criticism” in their speeches at the June 2 Party activists’ meeting. Secretary 
of the Party organization at the P. Zibertas silk factory, Yakovlev, remarked that 
the Party “cannot comfort ourselves with the thought that these disturbances 
arose spontaneously” and called on Party activists to examine carefully who 
took part in the unrest. In his June 2 speech, Guiga concluded that deiciencies in 
political work and indoctrination were the primary reason that young people were 
susceptible to the inluence of bourgeois propaganda and violated public order. 
At the same meeting, Bagdonas asserted that the lack of suficient indoctrination 
was “one of the primary reasons why the participants in the street disturbances 
in Kaunas were primarily young people studying in general education schools or 
professional technical institutes.”88 
the Kaunas Party organization was criticized for a number of failures in the 
political indoctrination of local young people. the may 30 decree began by stating 
that “signiicant transformations have taken place in the city of Kaunas during the 
years of Soviet power […] nevertheless, the recent unfavorable developments bear 
witness to the presence of considerable laws in the work of the Kaunas City Party 
organization.” the report condemned the city and district Party committees for 
failing to “pay suficient attention to developing a deep ideological conviction and 
political tenacity within young people or the workforce.” The report speciically 
blamed “considerable laws in the educational indoctrination work in schools and 
universities, but especially in public and vocational schools.” it also criticized 
the Kaunas Party, Komsomol and various other organizations for failing “to take 
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the necessary measures to expose and interrupt… the harmful inluence of the 
so‑called ‘hippie’ followers.”89
the Lithuanian communist Youth organization had particular cause for 
self‑criticism given that one‑quarter of the young people arrested were Komsomol 
members. In his speech on June 2, Komsomol Secretary Poškus admitted that 
The basic problem is the fact that Komsomol workers and Komsomol activists 
have a poor understanding of the popular mood of young people […] we must 
openly admit that in certain cases we are doing ourselves more harm than good, fearing to speak openly about individual cases of apolitical attitudes or anti‑Soviet hijinks and give them a principled Komsomol evaluation […] Of course, in this case, blame falls on Komsomol workers and the 
Komsomol activists.
However, Poškus also attempted to spread responsibility more broadly. He noted 
that “blame must also fall on the leaders of academic groups and class [school grade] 
leaders,” who lacked the proper ideological knowledge to instruct young people.
Communist Party oficials also held parents responsible for the problem of 
politically immature youth. In his speech on June 14, LiCP First Secretary Sniečkus 
stated that even the “children of Communists and responsible workers behave in 
an improper manner, poorly conduct themselves, and dress in a slovenly manner, 
and yet the parents bear absolutely no Party responsibility.” he accused parents 
of “providing their children with a ruble or two of pocket money, without taking 
an interest in how the children are spending that money.” According to Sniečkus, 
parents did “not demand that their children return home from school at any 
particular time. thus, it is possible to encounter a fairly large number of teenagers 
on the streets and in parks at 11:00 and even after 12:00 at night.”90 in a similar vein, 
Yakovlev denounced young people whose “standard of living is too high, they are 
allowed too many rights and freedoms.”91
in the view of the communist Party leadership, the young people’s actions 
on may 18‑19 represented a failure of proper integration into the collective.92 
in his June 2 report to Party activists, Kaunas city Party Secretary Lengvinas 
emphasized the failure of the collective to respond strongly to evident youth 
problems. He rebuked the leadership of the Communist Party and Komsomol, as 
well as schools and universities, for being “indecisive in eliminating shortcomings 
in the education and indoctrination of students” and for frequently failing “to 
respond to apathy, passivity, poor academic performance, and violations of public 
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order.” he called for a “serious re‑examination of the condition of indoctrination 
in schools and universities.” Lengvinas demanded that those responsible for the 
political indoctrination of young people actively work “against political apathy, 
the idealization of the past, and a nihilistic view of the victories of Socialism.” 
he also connected political immaturity with tolerance for western cultural practices. 
According to Lengvinas, “the esthetic and moral indoctrination of students must 
be fundamentally improved. An unkempt appearance, admiration for the West, 
and support for ‘hippies’ cannot be tolerated in our schools and universities.”93 
Similarly, Poškus, the head of the LiSSR Komsomol, expressed his opinion that the 
failure to integrate young people into the collective was the reason for the increase 
in the number of hippies in Kaunas. he stated that, 
it was only the insuficient attention paid to them by Komsomol organizations, 
as well as other social organizations, that led them to tearing themselves away 
from their collective, and made it possible for them to unite themselves into 
separate groups.94
LiCP First Secretary Sniečkus clearly situated the events in Kaunas within a broader 
context of Soviet social and political practices rather than speciically a problem in 
Soviet Lithuania. he also framed the Party’s self‑criticism as a renewed commitment 
to fulill the mandates of the 24th cPSu congress, held in march 1971. he reminded 
party activists that 
at the ifth plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
Lithuania, problems connected to the further development of national education 
in the republic were holistically discussed in light of the 24th congress of the CPSU. The resolutions that were passed call for concrete measures to be taken 
to further improve the education and indoctrination of the generation currently 
reaching adulthood. however, those decrees are not yet everywhere being into 
practice in the way that they should be.
By referring to Soviet concerns about the indoctrination of youth, Sniečkus diffused 
possible accusations that the events in Kaunas were unique and that the LicP itself 
had, therefore, failed uniquely.
conclusion
By deining the demonstrations as a childish outburst, Communist oficials denied 
that the participants might have had legitimate grievances with the Soviet system 
and denied their capacity to choose to express such grievances. Additionally, 
“political immaturity” on the part of the participants did not cede cultural power 
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94. ibid.
490 AmAndA JeAnne SwAin
to the West. In this narrative, young people were inluenced by Western cultural 
practices not because the west provided a viable alternative to communism, but 
because the young people were not “politically mature” enough to withstand its 
corrupting inluence. Neither did this interpretation acknowledge real shortcomings 
on the part of the Soviet union. the participants’ “political immaturity” was caused 
by a practical failure to inculcate them properly with communist values, not the 
failure of the system itself. In the view of Party oficials, these young people did 
not fully appreciate or take responsibility for the beneits of Communist society. 
As was typical in Soviet political culture, increased Party organization and more 
Party efforts in providing the proper communist political education were said to 
be the remedies. This article makes visible the process by which LiCP oficials 
struggled to articulate an ideologically acceptable narrative about the causes of the 
demonstrations. rather than simply repeating Party tropes for public consumption, 
Lithuanian communist leaders in 1972 were actively applying and, more 
importantly, discarding potential interpretations of the street demonstrations as 
they attempted to articulate an ideologically satisfactory explanation for the events. 
At the same time, the analysis of KgB interrogation statements reveals how 
young people negotiated boundaries by appealing to youthful “curiosity” to 
explain why they joined the crowds on the streets after Kalanta’s funeral. Like 
“political immaturity,” “curiosity” defused the political implications of the young 
people’s participation in the street demonstrations and instead deined it in more 
childlike terms. In claiming to have acted out of curiosity, the young people denied 
intentionality in their participation in the street demonstrations. indeed, by explaining 
their acts in such a way, young people consciously or unconsciously articulated the 
same ideological narrative of the street demonstrations as the communist Party 
oficials. Despite the young people’s and Communist Party’s insistence that the 
street demonstrations were not a manifestation of discontent, the analysis of youth 
cultural practices in Soviet Kaunas demonstrates the extent to which young people 
were indeed pushing the boundaries of acceptable youth activities. 
in his June 2 speech to Party activists about the street demonstrations, Kaunas 
Party Secretary Lengvinas declared that 
youth must realize that the rights that our social order gives them are inseparably 
coupled with an obligation to carry out their duties, and with responsibility to 
their collective and to their society.
Like Arūnas in the novel Arberonas – young people in Kaunas were called upon to 
leave behind the childish life of Western cultural practices and to take their place 
in Soviet society. 
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